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ABSTRACT 
In the summer of 1958, the Middle East was engulfed in crisis, and the Eisenhower 
administration was rethinking its regional policy. Israel saw a chance to 
demonstrate its value as a reliable strategic partner by supporting the Western 
military operation to secure Jordan. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion authorized 
overflights and tabled proposals for a strategic partnership. Though Washington 
proved responsive, Ben-Gurion abruptly terminated the overflights, and a severe 
diplomatic crisis ensued. It was neither sought nor welcomed by the parties, and 
left all baffled and dismayed. Ben-Gurion’s behaviour confounded contemporaries 
and historians: was he intimidated by Soviet threats? Did he yield to coalition 
pressures? Was he engaging in brinkmanship? New evidence shows that the root 
cause of the crisis was accidental, and ultimately it served only to cast doubt over 
Israel’s fortitude. 
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Abba Eban, Israel’s longest-serving ambassador to the United States, was nearing the end of 
his 10-year stint when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles summoned him to an extraordinary 
meeting at his residence on a Sunday afternoon, 3 August 1958. The ambassador buoyantly 
walked in, expecting a breakthrough conversation about the state of relations between 
Washington and Jerusalem. Relations between the two capitals had derailed in 1956, following 
Israel’s collusion with the British and French in the Suez campaign. But two years on Eban 
believed they were slowly getting back on track. Regional developments gave him reason for 
optimism: the Middle East was engulfed in political crisis, building up to a coup d’état in Iraq 
on 14 July 1958. The Americans sought to secure the region’s shaky pro-West regimes by 
dispatching marines to Lebanon, while the British prepared to airlift paratroopers to Jordan in 
a mission codenamed Operation Fortitude. But Saudi Arabia, Washington’s key Arab ally, 
refused to approve Western overflights across its territory; its king balked at openly challenging 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Soviet-backed Egyptian president who had raised the banner of 
radical pan-Arab nationalism. Loath though they were to involve Israel, the Western powers 
saw no alternative. On 15 July 1958, for the first time in its history, Israel was called upon to 
partake in a Western military operation. Its role was minor and passive, but nonetheless crucial 
to the operation’s success. 
The Western powers asked Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to authorize overflights of 
troops and supplies across Israeli territory. In so doing, he ran the risk of provoking Soviet and 
Arab reactions and upsetting his coalition government, but he also perceived a chance to 
redefine Israel’s relations with theWest. It was an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate 
what Ben-Gurion had long argued: that Israel could serve as a reliable bulwark against Soviet-
Nasserist expansion in the Middle East, a strategic asset for the West. Ben-Gurion decided to 
authorize the overflights. To ensure Israel’s support was not taken for granted, he conditioned 
the overflights on Washington’s willingness to consider entering into a strategic partnership 
with Israel. Specifically he demanded that Washington review its arms sales policy, offer 
clearer security guarantees, and support a programme for the consolidation of a Periphery Pact 
grouping of the non-Arab Middle Eastern states around Israel. On 1 August 1958 Dulles 
sent Ben-Gurion a letter promising him as much. 
Therefore, when Eban walked into Dulles’s home two days later, he was ‘expecting great 
achievements’. Instead, he ‘stepped into a boiling cauldron’.1 He found the Secretary ‘as 
agitated as I had ever seen him’.2 By meeting’s end Eban too was beside himself. It was ‘the 
gravest and most fateful meeting I had ever participated in’, the ambassador reported back.3 It 
emerged that a cable from Tel Aviv informed Dulles earlier that morning that Ben-Gurion had 
made a ‘dramatic and urgent demand’ for the immediate cessation of all overflights following 
the receipt of a threatening Soviet note.4 Dulles summoned Eban in order to strongly protest 
about the prime minister’s decision. The President and Dulles ‘were shocked to their core’ by 
Israel’s immediate and public capitulation to Soviet threats. Dulles was scathing: ‘There was 
panic [in Israel], and there was no consultation [with Washington], and there was a show of 
fear for the Russians to behold, which is the phenomenon most detrimental to peace in the 
region and the world at large’.5 Eban’s consternation was palpable. ‘After ceaseless efforts’, 
he wrote to Ben-Gurion, Israel finally seemed to be ‘standing at the threshold of a new era in 
our relations with the West, and suddenly as if the door locks shut’.6 In retrospect, too, the 
crisis is seen as a milestone in bilateral relations. Historian Peter Hahn appraised this episode 
as marking ‘the nadir in fifty years of US-Israeli relations’, generating a bilateral crisis more 
severe than the one following Suez.7 
Eban was as baffled as Dulles by Ben-Gurion’s decision. On return from the meeting he 
cabled Jerusalem: ‘Our position is highly perplexing to them’.8 Three weeks later, his head of 
mission was still searching the foreign ministry for answers: ‘To this day, those of us here 
cannot fathom why we went down that route’,9 he wrote. Half a century on, historians are none 
the wiser. Israel’s role in the Western operation has been examined in a range of studies, and 
nearly all took note of Ben-Gurion’s puzzling conduct.10 Ilan Pappé characterized the prime 
minister’s behaviour as ‘bizarre’,11 Roger Louis referred to it as ‘contradictory and 
eccentric’12 and Avi Shlaim described it as ‘rather muddled’.13 
Scholars have speculated about what stood behind the ‘strange game’14 the prime 
minister was playing. The majority of studies dealing with Israel’s conduct during the 1958 
crisis conclude that the Soviet note seriously alarmed Ben-Gurion, so much so that he quickly 
succumbed to Soviet demands, even though he was generally satisfied with Dulles’s letter.15 
A minority of scholars doubt that Ben-Gurion was genuinely intimidated by the Soviet threat. 
They reckoned he was dissatisfied with Dulles’s letter, whose commitments he considered all 
too vague. Of these, two suggested that Ben-Gurion decided to halt the overflights in an act of 
brinkmanship,16 hoping to extort further concessions from Washington; another two argued 
that with little in hand from Washington, Ben-Gurion could no longer quell dissent within his 
coalition government, and was forced to back down.17 Lastly, Hahn suggested that the crisis 
was driven by a substantive ‘divergence in U.S.–Israeli interests’.18 Either way, the root cause 
of the severe diplomatic crisis that broke out between Israel and the United States in the 
summer of 1958 remains a matter of speculation. The studies mentioned above have offered 
little evidence in support of their hypotheses. The starting point for this article, then, is the need 
to substantiate in historical evidence claims about the cause and significance of the crisis. 
The article constructs a narrative of the events that led up to and immediately followed 
on from the diplomatic crisis, so as to account for the decision that triggered it and in conclusion 
offer a reassessment of its consequences. Analysis draws on a pool of Israeli, American and 
British primary sources, including archival state documents and news reports, interviews, 
diaries and memoires of policymakers. The article concludes that the minority opinion is closer 
to the mark: evidence indicates that Ben-Gurion was unfazed by the Soviet note. At the same 
time, however, evidence also suggests that he was broadly content with Dulles’s letter and in 
control of his coalition. Furthermore, the study finds that the gap between the states’ strategic 
concerns had not widened in the immediate aftermath of the Baghdad coup, certainly not so far 
as to invite such a severe crisis. To the contrary: Dulles’s and Ben-Gurion’s thinking about the 
Middle East drew closer than ever before, Ben-Gurion welcomed Dulles’s promising letter, 
and both were eager to embark on a collaborative new stage in bilateral relations. The crisis 
was neither sought nor welcomed by the parties; indeed it took both by surprise, and left all 
involved baffled and dismayed.  
How then can we explain the outbreak of a severe diplomatic crisis in American–Israeli 
relations in early August 1958? New evidence, arrived at by the triangulation of three state 
perspectives, yields a fresh explanation for Ben-Gurion’s puzzling behaviour. The article 
argues that the root cause of the crisis was accidental – an entirely avoidable triviality of a 
day’s delay in the delivery of Dulles’s letter to Ben-Gurion. It finds that Israel’s prime minister 
acted primarily in rage – out of a growing sense of indignation at what he believed was 
Washington’s disregard for his urgent appeals, and its taking for granted of Israel’s support. 
His was an impulsive reaction, not a calculated manoeuvre. 
Historians have disputed not only the root cause of the diplomatic crisis, but also its 
consequences. Many identified the summer of 1958 as a turning point in American–Israeli 
relations.19 Avraham Ben-Zvi went as far as arguing that ‘The dramatic events of July 1958 
can be thought of as a conceptual watershed in American–Israeli relations’ – a trigger event 
that profoundly affected American perceptions of Israel by providing ‘definitive and ironclad 
proof of ... [Israel’s] value as a strategic asset to the US’.20 Scholars at the other end concluded 
that Ben-Gurion’s efforts to forge a strategic relationship with the United States in the summer 
of 1958 came to naught. The narrative presented here reinforces with new evidence the latter 
position that Washington’s perception of Israel’s strategic value remained fundamentally 
unchanged.21 It shows that Ben-Gurion’s move yielded a diplomatic crisis so severe that it left 
the prime minister dumbfounded. In trying to extricate Israel from the crisis situation, Ben-
Gurion then unwittingly dug himself even deeper, when he offered Dulles a laboured line of 
explanation that only cast further doubt over Israel’s fortitude and hence its potential to serve 
as a long-term strategic partner. That lingering doubt reinforced the State Department’s 
position that Israel remained a strategic liability to the United States, and ensured this position 
prevailed to the end of Eisenhower’s administration. 
 
Prelude to crisis 
The storm of Suez had just passed, when the Middle East horizon darkened again in early 1958. 
After months of unrest across the region, the radical current washed over Iraq, toppling its pro-
Western Hashemite monarchy in a bloody coup d’état on 14 July 1958. Within hours of news 
breaking, the Eisenhower administration was ready to state that it had seen Nasser’s Soviet-
guided hand in the coup.22 A week on, Dulles urged Eisenhower to ‘regard Arab nationalism 
as a flood which is running strongly’.23 The turbulent stream was threatening to burst its banks, 
and Washington had to decide whether to dam it up, or let it run its course. 
The Eisenhower administration had long vacillated between accommodating and 
confronting Nasser. Its regional policy was driven by the need to acquire dependable regional 
allies who could back the United States’ global campaign to contain the Soviet Union. Initially 
the administration had hoped that Nasser would come to fill the role. However, the populist 
Nasser soon set on a collision course with the Western powers, most notably by accepting 
Soviet arms in September 1955, and defiantly nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in July 
1956. From then on, Washington tried to stem the Nasserist surge. Eisenhower and Dulles 
believed Nasser’s ‘positive neutrality’ gave the Soviet Union a foothold in the Middle East 
and, in launching the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957, hoped to isolate and undermine him 
by buttressing his rivals: the conservative Arab regimes in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon 
and Libya. At the same time they tried not to antagonize the charismatic Egyptian leader too 
bitterly, as some felt he may yet prove to be the only force capable of uniting the Arab world 
and curbing Soviet penetration.24 In the immediate aftermath of the Baghdad coup the 
Administration embarked on a major review of its Middle East policy.25 Newspapers reported 
growing sentiments among policymakers in favour of the latter course of action.26 
The swing of the pendulum back towards rapprochement with Nasser perturbed Israeli 
policymakers. They feared that the West would opt to appease Nasser at Israel’s expense.27 
Washington was wavering between accommodating Nasser’s radical leadership, and propping 
up a conservative alternative. Both approaches came to terms with Arab nationalist aspirations, 
and both therefore precluded Israel as a strategic partner to the West. In this sense, the Baghdad 
coup opened a narrow window of opportunity for Israel. It brought down Iraq’s Hashemite 
regime, Britain’s key ally in the region, and unnerved the remaining conservative Arab regimes 
to the point that they had invited Western military intervention to secure their hold on power. 
At the same time, Washington’s key ally, Saudi Arabia, refused to openly support the 
operation, and the Western powers had to turn to Israel. While policymakers in Washington 
were debating whether to revert to working with the radical Nasser or continue to prop up his 
conservative rivals, Ben-Gurion saw his chance to put to them a third option: the Periphery 
Pact. 
Ben-Gurion argued that, in the long term, Washington could rely only on the non-Arab 
states in the Middle East. These, he noted, surpassed the Arab states in terms of combined 
population and territory, military power and economic development. Moreover, the non-Arab 
states were more stable politically and more decisively pro-Western. In effect, Ben-Gurion 
sought American support for an initiative that would bring together the four non-Arab states 
situated along the perimeter of the Middle East – Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia and Sudan – and 
consolidate them around Israel. The five demarcated a virtual ring that strategically encircled 
the Arab world, and Ben-Gurion hoped they would come to develop intense, if secret, 
collaborations across a range of military and civilian fields. Fundamentally, the proposal 
challenged the notion that Egypt was inevitably to become the region’s hegemonic power, 
promoting instead a new role for Israel as a key Western ally in the Middle East.28 In 
advancing the Periphery Pact alternative, Ben-Gurion hoped to open the door to a strategic 
partnership between Washington and Jerusalem, such that in the long term would secure for 
Israel a steady stream of advanced arms at affordable rates. The entire idea, of course, was 
premised on Israel’s dependability as a strategic partner, by contrast with Nasser’s radical 
volatility and King Saud’s unreliability. 
 
Quid pro quo 
Ben-Gurion’s chance to demonstrate Israel’s strategic value and fortitude came in the form of 
a British request for overflight permission, the morning after the Baghdad coup. Ben-Gurion 
saw a clear Israeli interest in facilitating the British military operation: to forestall – if not 
prevent – Nasser’s takeover of Jordan, and Israel’s complete encirclement by a unified Arab 
force. Yet he had qualms about the presence of British troops in Jordan, fearing they might 
constrain Israel’s freedom of action if border incidents broke out. He took the question to the 
inner circle of his government. Most ministers were inclined to acquiesce in the British request, 
yet – bearing Suez in mind – counselled Ben-Gurion to make sure Washington was supportive 
of the move. Ben-Gurion therefore summoned the American ambassador on the afternoon of 
16 July. He told him that overflights would render Israel a partner to the Western operation; it 
risked riling domestic and international public opinion, and provoking a dangerous Soviet 
reaction. Ben-Gurion could advise his government to consent only if Washington was 
explicitly supportive of the British request, and took responsibility for its consequences.29 
While awaiting Washington’s response, Ben-Gurion convened the full government on 
the morning of 17 July. He proposed to authorize the British overflights on condition of 
American backing. The proposal met with opposition: some ministers distrusted Britain so 
profoundly that they wanted no hand in its re-entry into the region; others highlighted the 
danger of stunting Israel’s budding relations with Afro–Asian nations; the most serious 
challenge, though, came from those who argued that the risk of entanglement in the global 
Cold War was too great. Everyone agreed that the prospect of another world war was highly 
remote, but they feared that openly standing with the West against the East might fatally 
endanger Israel’s existence in the long run. Ben-Gurion countered that Israel was unprepared 
at present to face in battle a unified Arab world and needed another decade to fortify itself. 
What if Israel refused to facilitate the Western operation and found itself encircled by pro-
Nasserist forces sooner rather than later? It would surely require American help and could not 
afford to be deemed obstructive to this Western operation. Ben-Gurion’s position prevailed: 
the decision to approve the British request to overfly 1500 troops was taken by a vote of eight 
to four.30 
Scholars suggested that Ben-Gurion’s decision two weeks later, to terminate the 
overflights, was prompted by mounting anxiety over an imminent Soviet reaction.31 It is 
therefore significant to note that documents of Israeli deliberations offer no evidence to support 
this interpretation. The decision certainly weighed heavy on Ben-Gurion and his ministers, but 
they referred to entanglement in a superpower confrontation more as a general and long term 
peril than a real, looming threat. The prime minister recorded the cabinet meeting in his diary 
in some detail, but made no mention of concerns raised over the possibility of an imminent 
Soviet reaction. Nor do transcripts of the full government meeting or the Knesset’s Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee (FASC) meeting, which Ben-Gurion attended on 16 July, 
mention such concerns. In fact, Ben-Gurion explicitly told the committee he believed that the 
Soviet ambassador to the United Nations was ‘bluffing when he said that the [American] 
landing in Lebanon could plunge the world into a new world war’.32  
When it came to working with the British, however, Israeli ministers proved justifiably 
wary: the road to collaboration was paved with pitfalls due to the overflights’ hasty execution. 
Washington had delivered Israel’s requested assurances by mid-day on 17 July, but the British 
did not wait for formal approval and their troop-carriers trespassed Israeli airspace while the 
government was still in session. In the event, Israeli fighters fired on the British planes, forcing 
some to turn back to their Cyprus base.33 Ben-Gurion was enraged by this slight of Israeli 
sovereignty and dispatched a protest note to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. He grew even 
more displeased when he had heard on the BBC the next morning that the number of 
paratroopers flown into Jordan exceeded two thousand.34 He sent Macmillan another sharply 
worded letter on 20 July. Remarking that the British air-command appeared to believe that 
Israel was an occupied country, he demanded overflights be stopped forthwith.35 Seeing as 
they could not persuade Ben-Gurion to authorize further overflights, the British asked the 
Americans to take over the supply operation.36 On 23 July, Dulles informed the Israeli 
embassy that the United States would assume a more active role in Jordan, and asked for 
Israel’s acquiescence in the American airlift.37 
Eban had already put to Dulles Israel’s interest in forging a strategic partnership in their 
meeting two days earlier, on 21 July.38 He had said that Israel made it possible to secure 
Jordan’s Hashemite regime, at great risk to its own security, by approving the British overflight 
request. The Western powers must recognize that in asking Israel to support the operation, they 
had effectively assumed ‘a new and special responsibility’ for its security. Israel wanted the 
United States to consider a fundamental shift in its approach to the question of military aid, 
and offer Israel a continual arms-supply programme. In addition, Eban pressed for a clearer 
security guarantee, by way of explicit reference to Israel’s ‘independence and integrity’ in the 
context of Washington’s definition of its vital interests in the Middle East. In the longer-term, 
Israel asked for Washington’s help in encouraging Iran, Turkey, Sudan and Ethiopia to 
cooperate with it. Israel also wanted Washington to establish a permanent framework for 
regular consultations, intelligence exchanges and the coordination of security policies with 
Israel. 
When Dulles and Eban met again on 23 July, Eban pressed Israel’s requests with greater 
force. If hitherto Israelis only mentioned what they hoped to gain in return for their country’s 
part in the Western operation, Israel’s acquiescence to further overflights was now given, for 
the first time, on an explicit quid pro quo basis. Eban handed Dulles a letter from Ben-Gurion 
to Eisenhower, which conveyed Israel’s interest in obtaining American support for the 
consolidation of the Periphery Pact grouping that would stand as ‘a strong dam against the 
Nasserist–Soviet torrent’.39 According to Eban’s report, Dulles read Ben-Gurion’s letter 
carefully and said, ‘This is a very important letter. It is most important to get it to President at 
once’. He added that Ben-Gurion’s letter expressed many ideas corresponding to his own. In 
response to Eban’s prodding, Dulles added ‘I see no reason why I should not indicate to Turkey 
and Iran our feeling of satisfaction that there are developing ties between you and these two 
countries’.40 
Dulles then raised the American overflight request. Eban replied that Israel could not 
permit airlifts indefinitely: demands were being made upon Israel as if it were an ally, and 
indeed Israel took risks befitting an ally, but all that time Israel had not been given the security 
guarantees of an ally. Eban was authorized to confirm that Israel ‘would turn a blind eye [to 
overflights] for a few more days … until it received a clear answer as to whether the United 
States saw merit in discussing Israel’s proposals, and also until Israel received Britain’s 
reply’.41 When Dulles said he assumed the airlift operation would terminate within two weeks, 
Eban insisted he was only authorized to promise ‘a few days’, and even that was specifically 
in the context of Israel’s expectation that within those few days it would be informed of 
Washington’s consent to enter into serious discussions regarding the proposals that Ben-Gurion 
had put forward. In instructing Eban to take this highly unusual tone with Dulles, and explicitly 
condition Israel’s consent to authorize the latest overflight request on Washington’s agreement 
to discuss a strategic relationship with Israel, Ben- Gurion had made it clear that he was 
determined to exploit the crisis situation to the full.  
On 25 July, Eisenhower wrote to Ben-Gurion thanking him for sharing his views and 
promising that Dulles would soon write a more substantive response.42 Ben-Gurion was not 
greatly encouraged. His impression of the Eban–Dulles talks on 21 July was that the meeting 
was conducted ‘in good atmosphere, but without any real results for the time being’.43 
Growing disquiet was evident in Ben-Gurion’s dealings with Eban.44 His anxiety heightened 
when news reports emerged on 28 July, suggesting that Washington would give ‘friendly 
consideration’ to a Soviet initiative for an arms embargo in the Middle East, under condition 
that it would exclude only Baghdad Pact members Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.45 He cabled 
Eban wanting to know: ‘How could this settle with the secretary’s promise to review our arms 
request, and with the president’s message confirming US interest in Israel’s security?’ Eban 
was instructed to undertake urgent action in this regard, as well as with regard to Eisenhower’s 
promise that Dulles would soon reply in detail to Ben-Gurion’s letter.46 Ensuing enquiries by 
Israel’s representatives in Washington confirmed that Dulles’s reply was still being drafted, 
and should be expected shortly.47 
 
Puzzling move 
Dulles finally dispatched his letter of response to Ben-Gurion’s partnership proposals on the 
afternoon of Friday, 1 August 1958. He confirmed that much of what Ben-Gurion had written 
in his letter to the president was ‘close to our own thinking’, and expressed deep appreciation 
for Israel’s acquiescence in Western overflights. As far as Ben-Gurion’s request for US support 
for the Periphery Pact, Dulles confirmed that ‘we are prepared to do what we can to be of 
assistance’. He added: ‘We believe that Israel should be in a position to deter an attempt at 
aggression by indigenous forces, and are prepared to examine the military implications of this 
problem with an open mind’.48 Although Dulles’s letter did not go as far as Ben-Gurion had 
hoped, it contained the most far-reaching promises hitherto given to Israel. Dulles, therefore, 
expected it would be received with appreciation. Yet, on the following afternoon, 2 August, 
Ben-Gurion informed the American and British ambassadors that all overflights must come to 
an immediate and complete stop. By way of explanation, Ben-Gurion referred to a threatening 
note, issued by the Soviet government on 1 August, which stated that in permitting overflights, 
Israel had rendered itself ‘an immediate associate’ in aggressive acts against Arab countries.49 
Ben-Gurion’s abrupt decision, made without as much as consulting Washington, infuriated 
Dulles. 
Was Ben-Gurion genuinely intimidated by the Soviet threat? It is significant to note that 
the Soviet protest came as no surprise to Ben-Gurion. Talking to the British ambassador on 22 
July, Ben-Gurion had said that he was anxious precisely because so far the Soviet Union 
appeared to let pass Israel’s part in the operation. He was expecting Moscow to protest, and 
was puzzled by its silence. In fact, the prime minister remarked, he would have felt more at 
ease had Israel been delivered a Soviet protest!50 Second, the prime minister’s diary and 
meeting records reveal a rather cool attitude towards the Soviet note in the 24 hours that had 
passed between its receipt and Ben-Gurion’s abrupt decision to suspend the overflights. Upon 
receiving the note on the evening of 1 August, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that it was ‘paved 
with threats to the “national interests” of Israel’,51 but his subsequent move appears quite 
measured: Eban was instructed to inform Dulles the next morning that Moscow’s strong protest 
had reinforced the prime minister’s belief that in influencing Israel to permit the overflights, 
Washington had taken on a greater moral responsibility for Israel’s security. At the same time, 
Eban indicated to Dulles that Israel would not be intimidated by the Soviet note. He told the 
secretary that Israel planned to reply by saying, inter alia, that it could not accept the charge of 
assisting in ‘aggressive acts’ since a Soviet-proposed UN Security Council resolution that had 
called the Western operation ‘aggressive’ was defeated by a vote of ten to one.52 Nor was great 
urgency or alarm indicated by the prime minister’s moves on Saturday, 2 August. According 
to his diary, Ben-Gurion’s morning was taken up by lengthy meetings with the World Jewish 
Congress president and top coalition-parties’ members. In discussing Israel’s foreign-policy 
agenda with them, Ben-Gurion spoke of his Periphery Pact, but did not even mention the Soviet 
note, which by then had been made public by Soviet news-agency Tass. Following this 
meeting, Ben-Gurion dryly logged in his diary the news that Italy had also received a Soviet 
protest note.53 
The prime minister’s next appointment on Saturday afternoon was with the British 
ambassador, Sir Francis Rundall. The meeting was scheduled at Rundall’s request and the 
prime minister did not know in advance what the ambassador wished to discuss. Rundall told 
Ben-Gurion that Britain had finally managed to open a land route through Aqaba, but again 
needed to dispatch more troops in order to secure supply transport-lines, and therefore required 
further overflight permissions. This new request visibly outraged Ben-Gurion, who flatly 
rejected it, telling Rundall he found it ‘perplexing and saddening’ that Macmillan could make 
such a request, especially after Israel had received the Soviet protest.54 Thus, it was only after 
Rundall had put forward Britain’s latest overflight request that Ben-Gurion began speaking of 
the Soviet note with a heightened sense of alarm. He said he was drafting without delay a reply 
to the Soviet note, which was to be dispatched as soon as it was approved at the weekly cabinet 
meeting the next morning.  
Rundall questioned the need for a precipitous reply and asked whether Israel could delay 
it ‘for a day or so, to give us time to complete this operation’.55 Ben-Gurion rejected the idea 
outright. He also made a point of telling Rundall that he had intended on calling him the 
previous evening, ‘following the Soviet note’, to demand that Britain discontinue its 
overflights.56 Ben-Gurion did not explain to Rundall why he had not in fact called? him on 1 
August, but later he told US Ambassador Edward Lawson this was because he ‘had run out of 
time’.57 We may presume that had the prime minister been truly anxious about an imminent 
Soviet response he would have made it his top priority to inform the British of his decision to 
terminate the overflights. Moreover, had Ben-Gurion been troubled by the Soviet note itself, 
he could have been expected to urgently call upon his aides to assess the gravity of the situation 
and formulate Israel’s response. Ben-Gurion indeed consulted them, but only on the morning 
of 3 August, when he learnt that top foreign ministry officials did not find the Soviet protest 
alarmingly sharp in tone, and believed Israel need not hurry to reply.58  
Right after his meeting with Rundall, on Saturday afternoon, 2 August, Ben-Gurion sent 
word to inform Lawson that the American overflights must also come to an immediate and 
complete stop. Lawson asked whether they may continue until 6 August, when the programme 
was scheduled to terminate. He was told the prime minister was ‘very insistent on [the] need 
for speedy action and was extremely serious re[garding the] urgency of [the] matter’: Ben-
Gurion was already drafting his reply to the Soviet note, and resolved to bring it to his 
government on Sunday morning. Lawson questioned the basis for this ‘dramatic and urgent 
demand’. He was told that upon receiving the Soviet note, Ben-Gurion had been on the verge 
of calling in the ambassadors because he felt he had overstretched the authority granted to him 
by his government.59  
From the outset Ben-Gurion was hesitant about authorizing the Western overflights and 
wanted to see them over as quickly as possible. On 24 July he was persuaded by his 
ambassadors in Washington and London to allow overflight continuation for ‘a few days’ 
longer as a means of winning British and American goodwill in considering his arms requests 
and strategic partnership proposals. When a week had passed and neither power informed him 
that the overflights had been brought to an end, nor that his proposals had been accepted, Ben-
Gurion seriously began contemplating their termination. The delivery of the Soviet note may 
have reinforced his determination to do so, but he ultimately did not go ahead with it until 
Rundall had submitted the new British overflight request. On the spot, the dismayed Ben-
Gurion not only rejected Rundall’s new request, but also demanded that all other overflights 
must come to end at once. In explaining his decision to Rundall and Lawson, Ben-Gurion tied 
his refusal to the threatening Soviet note, but the lack of urgency in his actions during the 24 
hours that had passed since the note’s delivery indicates there was more frustration and 
indignation behind his decision than anxiety. Ben-Gurion, whose patience had worn thin over 
two weeks due to the inconclusive discussions with the Western powers, appears to have 
snapped on 2 August, when Rundall came to see him on what the prime minister described in 
his diary as ‘an unexpected and unsightly mission’.60 When Rundall left the room Ben-Gurion, 
clearly exasperated, told his aides that the British request was ‘insolent’.61 
The narrative above indicates that fear of an imminent Soviet response was not the 
primary factor behind Ben-Gurion’s decision to terminate the overflights, as the majority of 
scholars argued. A minority suggested that Ben-Gurion tried to extract further concessions 
from Dulles against a background of a looming coalition crisis. The prime minister certainly 
faced domestic pressures, but there is no evidence to suggest that he deemed them 
insurmountable at any point. Unrest within his coalition did not prevent Ben-Gurion from 
pushing through government the decision to renew the overflights on 10 August. Indeed, he 
contentedly noted in his diary that he was able to gain ‘a free hand in formulating the [reply] 
note, as well as on the question of the American overflights’.62 Some scholars explained the 
move as an act of brinkmanship following from Ben-Gurion’s dissatisfaction with Dulles’s 
response to his proposals. I found no evidence in support of this explanation. Ben-Gurion’s 
first impression upon reading Dulles’s letter, as recorded in a foreign ministry memorandum 
of conversation, seems far from bitter disappointment. Ben-Gurion said that ‘it seems Dulles’s 
reply is quite positive, and hopefully we will devote ourselves to it’. He made note of the fact 
that Dulles did not provide the guarantees Israel had asked for, but nonetheless told Lawson he 
believed that if the letter’s contents were carried out ‘we could turn the Middle East around, 
and the Soviet invasion would be halted’. The prime minister concluded the conversation on a 
hopeful note, saying ‘may we together devote ourselves to organising the pro-western forces 
in the region in order to put an end to the expansion of Nasser and the USSR’.63 Dulles’s letter 
was also viewed as constructive by top foreign ministry officials.64 
 
The difference a day makes 
Dulles’s letter surely did not go as far as Ben-Gurion had hoped. Yet the prime minister and 
his aides believed it provided an unprecedented opening for further discussions, and they 
expressed interest in following up on it. Why, then, would Ben-Gurion risk antagonizing 
Washington by halting the overflights on 2 August? The answer to this puzzle lies in a small 
detail, hitherto overlooked. Although Dulles’s letter was dated Friday, 1 August, the day before 
Ben-Gurion had decided to suspend the overflights, the letter was held up over a long weekend 
at the American embassy in Tel Aviv and actually delivered to Ben-Gurion only three days 
later, on the afternoon of Monday, 4 August. Ben-Gurion’s decision to suspend the overflights 
was thus taken not despite Dulles’s letter, but rather due to its supposed absence. 
Ten days had passed since Eban had told Dulles that Israel would overlook the airlift for only 
‘a few days’ longer while Washington considered Ben-Gurion’s proposals. On 2 August 
Rundall turned up to request yet another overflight authorization without as much as a nod to 
Ben-Gurion’s proposals. The prime minister took it to signify the Western powers’ disregard 
for his appeals, and taking Israel’s support for granted. Enraged, he withdrew authorization for 
all overflights. 
Eban had informed Ben-Gurion on Thursday, 31 July, that Dulles was still working on a 
draft response,65 but it was only on Sunday, 3 August, that the ambassador was finally able to 
confirm by short telegram that he had obtained a copy of the letter. As far as he knew, the 
telegram was sent to the American embassy in Tel Aviv two days earlier, on the evening of 
Friday, 1 August. Ben-Gurion noted in his diary entry of 3 August that he found this ‘curious’, 
seeing as he ‘had not yet received notification to that effect from Lawson’. He therefore 
requested that Eban immediately forward him a copy of Dulles’s letter.66 On Monday 
morning, 4 August, Ben-Gurion received two cables from his embassy in Washington: one 
containing the text of Dulles’s letter, the other carrying an alarming message from Eban, 
reporting that on Sunday afternoon, 3 August, he was urgently summoned to Dulles’s home 
and found him ‘more agitated than I had ever seen him’. Dulles, who did not know that Ben-
Gurion had not read his letter yet, spoke strongly. The overflights themselves were no longer 
the main issue; a far graver issue, Dulles asserted, was the fact that Israel appeared to exhibit 
alarming weakness and panic in the face of empty Soviet threats. He questioned whether Israel 
was mentally capable and willing to withstand them. If it was not, Dulles said, then 
the picture of relations between Israel and the United States drastically changed and the 
impression of partnership that prevailed since the onset of the situation... would be 
shattered. The deep impression that Ben-Gurion’s letter had made... was now being 
undermined ... subservience to Soviet threats will leave you in a position where you will 
have no friends. 
Eban objected to Dulles’s interpretation. He insisted that Ben-Gurion’s decision, derived from 
‘cool and balanced judgment’, was based on the belief that the new British request involved 
sending additional troops into Jordan ‘which were an added convenience, but not crucial for 
the support of the British operation’. He admitted that Ben-Gurion took the Soviet note very 
seriously because Israel lacked a formal security guarantee from the United States and was 
deeply concerned over the malevolent power of the Soviet Union ‘which could destroy Israel 
in five minutes’. Dulles exclaimed that ‘the Eisenhower Doctrine had made it clear that the US 
would come to the support of Israel should it be attacked by a Communist power’, and he could 
not understand why Ben-Gurion found this basic fact so difficult to grasp. The United States, 
he said, 
had committed to Israel no less than it had to any other state in the world, including 
NATO states, that if it were attacked by the USSR, the United States would fight for it 
.... If the Prime Minister did not believe this solemn commitment ... it was his right to do 
so, but then there was no possibility of achieving partnership with the United States. 
Dulles concluded by telling Eban ‘I want to know where you stand’. Eban replied: ‘There is no 
doubt where we stand’. The secretary wryly retorted: ‘We shall see’.67 
It was only on the afternoon of Monday, 4 August, amid all the commotion over the 
secretary’s outrage, that Ambassador Lawson came to see Ben-Gurion, carrying with him a 
formal copy of Dulles’s much-awaited letter. The letter was dispatched from Washington on 
Friday evening, 1 August, and was indeed received by the embassy in Tel Aviv on Saturday, 2 
August. But it was not until the afternoon of Monday, 4 August, that Lawson handed it over to 
Ben-Gurion. Upon delivery, Lawson explained that the delay was due to the fact that he ‘did 
not wish to bother the prime minister on the Sabbath’. Ben-Gurion replied: ‘That is a pity ....’68 
If it was the case that the ambassador decided to hold off the letter’s delivery until Monday, 
then he appears to have committed a gross error of judgement. Did he fail to realize the 
importance of the letter and how anxious Ben-Gurion had been to receive it? It is difficult to 
believe that Lawson had the letter in hand yet chose not to mention it when notified of Ben-
Gurion’s decision to suspend the airlift – a decision Lawson himself described as ‘dramatic 
and urgent’ in his report to Washington. Furthermore, Lawson did not actually deliver the letter 
until Monday afternoon. This would suggest that he was sparing not only the prime minister’s 
Saturday, but also his own Sunday rest (Sunday being a normal workday in Israel, in all but 
foreign embassies). Lawson kept his job, so perhaps a lower-level blunder had occurred at the 
embassy. At any rate, it remains that Ben-Gurion was unaware of Dulles’s largely positive 
response to his proposals when he decided to put a stop to the overflights; nor was the furious 
Dulles aware of the fact that Ben-Gurion had taken this critical decision without reading his 
letter first. 
In his meeting with Lawson on 4 August, Ben-Gurion said that Dulles’s charges of Israeli 
subservience to Soviet demands had stunned him to such extent that he had barely had the 
opportunity to digest his letter’s contents. In an about-face, Ben-Gurion now said he had no 
intention of urgently replying to the Soviet note. When the government discussed the matter in 
its weekly meeting on 3 August, Ben-Gurion informed it he would not be dispatching the reply 
before the next weekly meeting. In fact, he told Lawson, he had not yet even begun to draft his 
reply.69 Ben-Gurion then received Rundall, who pressed for authorization for several more 
days of British overflights. He found Ben-Gurion adamant not to bring the matter again to his 
government as long as he remained unconvinced of the request’s necessity. Rundall replied 
that ‘this was quite unsatisfactory’ because the problem was pressing.70 Ben-Gurion grew 
infuriated: Rundall had ‘badgered me for an hour and a half ’ with his ‘insolent pleas’, Ben-
Gurion wrote in his diary, ‘at times I wanted to get up and throw him out of the room’.71 
 
Backtracking 
Soon after reading Dulles’s letter, Ben-Gurion reversed his decision to halt the overflights. The 
American airlift to Jordan resumed on 6 August, and lasted four days.72 In a long-winded letter 
to Dulles, Ben-Gurion expressed his distress at the ‘misunderstanding’ that had arisen. Eban 
reported that Dulles had interpreted the overflight halt as panicked surrender that cast doubt 
over Israel’s value as a loyal partner.73 Needing to assure Washington of Israel’s steadfastness 
and reliability, Ben-Gurion now strongly denied there was any direct relation between the 
overflights’ termination and the Soviet note. Even if the American embassy was at fault for 
holding up Dulles’s letter, Ben-Gurion could hardly use this fact to justify his exasperated 
move. He thus portrayed his decision as coolheaded, based on the belief that further airlifts 
were not crucial to the Western operation, and no longer justified ‘the serious embarrassments 
and dangers’ involved in the overflights of Israeli territory. Such reasoning certainly factored 
in Ben-Gurion’s decision, but cannot in itself explain why he took the decision so abruptly, 
without as much as consulting Washington or his own aides.  
A 10 August letter from Dulles to Ben-Gurion insisted on setting the record straight, but 
nonetheless concluded that the overflights’ resumption would ‘go far to eliminate adverse 
repercussions of their having been interrupted’, and expressed hope that ‘we can consider the 
situation which arose out of the interruption of our flights a closed matter’.74 What was the 
long-lasting significance of this chain of events? The Israelis’ greatest fear was that Dulles 
would retract the positions expressed in his 1 August letter, and that ‘all the efforts we have 
invested for weeks, would go down the drain’.75 They were concerned that the crisis would 
not so easily be forgotten, and ‘might get thrown in our face sometime in the future’.76 Most, 
however, came to the conclusion that Ben-Gurion’s reversal had satisfied Dulles.77 
The proposals contained in Ben-Gurion’s letter to Eisenhower of 24 July seem to have 
fallen on receptive ears. Yet, it was a very narrow window of opportunity that Israel managed 
to crack open. It rested largely on Dulles’s personal receptiveness to the idea that Israel’s 
Periphery Pact may work to contain the flood-tide of Nasserism. Whereas Dulles expressed 
enthusiasm for the proposals from the start, State Department officials were far more 
apprehensive. Thus, while Dulles remarked to Eban that Eisenhower’s letter of 25 July ‘had 
not gone as far as the President would have liked’,78 State Department records suggest that it 
was rather Dulles who wished it had gone farther.79 A gap between the secretary and his State 
Department officials was also apparent when time came to formulate Dulles’s reply to Ben-
Gurion. Dulles had sent back the letter drafted by his aides, commenting that it was ‘inadequate, 
and asked that it be thoroughly re-drafted’, so as to address ‘itself more to the heart of the 
important issues raised in Ben-Gurion’s carefully thought-out letter’.80  
Shortly after the airlift resumed, State Department officials studied the episode and 
concluded that in light of it, new weight should be given to their initial reservations about Ben-
Gurion’s proposals. In a memorandum to Dulles on 11 August, Policy Planning Staff Director 
Gerard Smith wrote that although Ben-Gurion’s letter to the president ‘was closely reasoned, 
his arguments have not convinced me of the usefulness of an informal entente among Israel, 
Ethiopia, Iran, Sudan and Turkey’. Having noted the Periphery Pact’s key weakness, 
specifically the unlikelihood of keeping it a secret for long, Smith pointed to a further problem. 
‘The cornerstone of the suggested entente’, he wrote, ‘is not firm.’81 In making this argument, 
Smith referred to the letter that Ben-Gurion had sent Dulles on 5 August, consenting to the 
overflights’ resumption. In it, Ben-Gurion highlighted the grave risks Israel had incurred ‘for 
ourselves and our brethren’, emphatically stating that: 
For forty years, millions of our brethren in the Soviet Union itself have stood up to fearful 
pressures … I was therefore shocked to hear that you found it possible to say to our 
Ambassador that Israel had ‘caved in’ immediately to a Soviet threat ....82  
Ben-Gurion’s decision to evoke Israel’s deep commitment to the Jewish Diaspora as testament 
to his country’s resilience had the opposite effect – reminding the administration of one of 
Israel’s key strategic vulnerabilities. In his memo to Dulles, Smith explained that  
Ben-Gurion may or may not have panicked from fear of Soviet measures against Israel 
when he recently sought to terminate our overflights en route to Jordan. One 
consideration that clearly did sway him is indicated by the reference... to the ‘millions of 
our brethren in the Soviet Union.’ These brethren, their well-being and the possibility of 
their release for emigration to Israel will strongly influence the policy toward the USSR 
of any likely Israeli government. 
Smith acknowledged that Dulles, in his 1 August letter to Ben-Gurion, had given ‘a qualified 
blessing to his entente concept’. Yet, he argued, ‘that letter was drafted before the overflight 
incident, and you may now wish to re-examine the utility of Ben-Gurion’s concept’.83 Dulles 
did indeed reconsider his position, and on 18 August approved his staff’s recommendation that 
from now on, ‘we exercise extreme caution in giving Ben-Gurion further encouragement or 
support in the development of his projected five-nation entente, in view of the grave political 
hazards involved in it’.84 
 
Conclusion 
The Israelis persisted in their efforts to set up the Periphery Pact, which yielded close if covert 
relations with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. However, despite Israel’s concerted attempts, the 
argument that Israel’s Periphery Pact could become a viable alternative to Nasser in the region 
found little resonance with the administration. As long as Dulles remained secretary of state, 
he served to restrain those voices within the administration that called to improve relations with 
Nasser. However, in late 1958, Dulles’s health began to deteriorate, and he eventually resigned 
his post in mid-April 1959, and passed away a little over a month later. During his period of 
illness, the idea of seeking an accommodation with Nasser regained ground within the 
administration. By mid-1959, much to Israel’s chagrin, Washington gradually reverted to a 
more pragmatic position of pursuing cautious rapprochement with Nasser.85 Although this 
shift coincided with Dulles’s illness, it should not be attributed merely to his physical decline. 
During the July crisis, Dulles himself had consistently taken the view that the United States 
‘must regard Arab nationalism as a flood which is running strongly. We cannot successfully 
oppose it, but we can put up sandbags around positions we must protect’.86 Dulles remained 
strongly opposed to ‘trying to work with Nasser’, whom he believed could not be stopped, like 
Hitler.87 His way of dealing with the Nasserist threat was by trying to keep him within bounds, 
containing rather than frontally opposing him, ‘until the flood had eventually subsided’.88 
Support for Israel’s Periphery Pact may well have been regarded by Dulles as one such 
sandbag, a temporary and exceptional measure. Once the July crisis abated, so did his 
enthusiasm for the concept, and for taking the risks entailed in developing a quiet strategic 
partnership with Israel. 
In retrospect, the diplomatic crisis triggered by Ben-Gurion’s decision may seem minor. 
It was in so far as the crisis was contained in duration and scope. Moreover, severe as this 
bilateral diplomatic crisis was, it was dwarfed in comparison to the drama of shaken regimes 
and restive societies that gripped the region at the time. Yet, the significance of the diplomatic 
crisis comes into view when it is framed in the broader context of the fragile state of American–
Israeli relations post-1956, and located at the juncture of the major regional policy review upon 
which Washington had embarked in the second half of 1958. In July 1958, after a year of 
turmoil that appeared to advance Soviet interests in the Middle East, the Eisenhower 
administration was preparing to review its regional policy. As the West’s line-up of Arab allies 
were crumbling one by one, Israel was given a chance to demonstrate its value and fortitude as 
a strategic partner of the Western powers. The crisis that broke out between Jerusalem and 
Washington in early August 1958 jeopardized the trust and goodwill laboriously built up 
between the two capitals since the Suez debacle. More importantly, it critically undermined 
Ben-Gurion’s ability to persuade Dulles to foster a quiet strategic partnership with Israel. 
The findings of this research render a hitherto puzzling historical event intelligible and 
consequential, by showing that Ben-Gurion’s manoeuvres not only critically jeopardized the 
recovery of bilateral relations between Israel and the United States post-Suez, but also nullified 
Ben-Gurion’s achievement of an incipient Western recognition for Israel’s strategic value, no 
sooner than it was accorded. As a result, Israeli policymakers lost their tenuous grip on the 
possibility of influencing Washington’s review of its Middle East policy, part of their ongoing 
efforts to sway Dulles away from falling back to a line accommodative of Nasser. The long 
wait for Dulles’s response stretched Ben-Gurion’s nerves to breaking point. His efforts to 
accelerate the process of aligning Israel with the West ultimately proved a hindrance. The 
diplomatic rift between Washington and Jerusalem was soon patched up, but Ben-Gurion’s 
primary drive at the time was to reap long-term strategic dividends from Israel’s supportive 
role in the Western operation. His aim was to capitalize on Israel’s contribution to the Western 
operation by tying its overflight acquiescence to a broader framework of strategic cooperation, 
such that would ensure that Israel’s strategic value in the eyes of the Western powers did not 
diminish as soon the immediate crisis blew over. In this he was unsuccessful. 
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